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We have studied the impact of time-dependent learning capacities of players in the framework of spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game. In our model, this capacity of players may decrease or increase in time after strategy
adoption according to a step-like function. We investigated both possibilities separately and observed signifi-
cantly different mechanisms that form the stationary pattern of the system. The time decreasing learning activity
helps cooperator domains to recover the possible intrude of defectors hence supports cooperation. In the other
case the temporary restrained learning activity generates a cyclic dominance between defector and cooperator
strategies, which helps to maintain the diversity of strategies via propagating waves. The results are robust
and remain valid by changing payoff values, interaction graphs or functions characterizing time-dependence of
learning activity. Our observations suggest that dynamically generated mechanisms may offer alternative ways
to keep cooperators alive even at very larger temptation to defect.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
The possible survival of cooperator strategy when defec-
tion pays more is a widely studied puzzle that is in the interest
of very different disciplines from biology and physics [1] to
economy and social sciences [2]. In the framework of evolu-
tionary game theory several new mechanisms and player spe-
cific conditions were identified in the last decade that promote
cooperation among selfish individuals [3–5]. Without listing
all of them, we should mention the seminal observation of
Santos and Pacheco [6] who realized that the heterogeneity of
the interaction graph can amplify the mechanism of so-called
network reciprocity [7]. To follow this avenue, other types of
heterogeneity of players were also identified which also in-
crease the chance for cooperators to keep alive. These are the
heterogeneity of strategy teaching activity [8], social diversity
[9, 10], heterogeneous influential effect [11], variousness of
payoffs [12] or payoff allocation [13]. Generally, the com-
mon mechanism behind these conditions is the enhanced pos-
sibility to form homogeneous cooperator clusters against the
invasion of defectors.
Heterogeneity itself, however, is not a sufficient condition
for promoting cooperation if the above mentioned mecha-
nism cannot work. To give an example, the heterogeneity of
strategy learning capacity does not support cooperation no-
tably [8]. Accordingly, we do not expect relevant change by
allowing different strategy learning skills for players during
strategy imitation process. A conceptually different situation
emerges when a quantity that determines imitation of neigh-
bors is time-dependent during the evolution of strategies. This
extended freedom of the evolutionary process, as a kind of
coevolutionary model [14], may result in spontaneous evolu-
tion to a cooperator promoting heterogeneous state [15], but
may also offer dynamically maintained mechanisms to help
cooperators. For example, the age related teaching activ-
ity of players, when player’s teaching activity increases with
elapsed time after strategy pass, resulted a new type of dy-
namical mechanism that based on biased propagation of dif-
ferent strategies [16]. More precisely, a highly selective pro-
motion of cooperator-cooperator and defector-defector pairs
emerges, which hinders influential defectors from spreading
their strategy effectively across the interaction graph. On
the other hand, a similar blocking mechanism does not exist
around aged cooperators, who can spread cooperation via sup-
porting cooperator newborns in the neighborhood. As we ar-
gued earlier, similar mechanism cannot be expected for time-
dependent strategy learning capacity of players because this
type of diversity is unable to amplify network reciprocity.
The changing learning capability of players, however, is a
viable assumption that should be considered. As we will ar-
gue in the next section, both the time-decreasing and time-
increasing learning capacity of players are reasonable in evo-
lutionary game models. By using the payoff elements of
prisoner’s dilemma, as the most challenging social dilemma,
it turned out that the mentioned time dependences of learn-
ing skill have very different impacts on the stationary state.
While time-decreasing learning capacity has a modest, but un-
ambiguous cooperator promoting impact, the time-increasing
learning skill results in a new type of state that can only be
previously observed if more than two strategies were present
in the system [17]. Although the change between the model
definitions is tiny but the emerging mechanisms that form the
stationary patterns are completely different. In the first case
a sort of recovery mechanism helps cooperator domains to
protect against the invasion of defectors, while in the second
model a dynamically generated cyclic dominance maintains
the diversity of strategies, even at hard conditions when coop-
erators cannot survive normally.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the
next section we describe the studied models by also briefly
discussing some possible extensions. In Sec. III we present
the results of the first mentioned model. The result of the other
type of time-dependence for learning capacity is presented in
Sec. IV. Finally, we summarize our observations and discuss
their potential implications.
2II. MODELS
For the sake of simplicity we study the weak version of
prisoner’s dilemma game that is characterized with the single
variable parameter of temptation to defect T = b, the payoff
received by a defector if playing against a cooperator, while
the remaining payoff values are fixed. These elements are the
reward for mutual cooperationR = 1, the punishment for mu-
tual defection P = 0, and the suckers payoff S = 0 received
by a cooperator if playing against a defector [7]. We should
note here, however, that our main observations remain intact
if real prisoner’s dilemma is considered by using S < 0 val-
ues. On the other hand, the temptation value is extended to
0 < b < 2 interval to explore the stag-hunt region, too.
Keeping the model as simple as possible, the interaction
graph of players is supposed to be a L × L square lattice
where every player interacts with its four nearest neighbors
by using the previously defined payoff elements. (The exten-
sion to other types of interaction graphs is also discussed in
Sec. IV.) Initially, each player x on the graph is designated as
a cooperator (sx = C) or defector D with equal probability.
During the evolutionary process a randomly selected player
x acquires its payoff px by playing the game with its nearest
neighbors separately. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor,
denoted by y, also acquires its payoff py by playing the game
with its four neighbors. Finally, player x tries to enforce its
strategy sx on player y in accordance with the probability
W (sx → sy) = wy
1
1 + exp[(py − px)/K]
, (1)
where K denotes the amplitude of noise [18] and 0 < wy ≤ 1
characterizes the strategy learning capability of player y.
The latter parameter characterizes the willingness of player
y how she/he easily adopts the strategy of a neighbor inde-
pendently on the payoff differences. This feature of players
should not be necessarily constant in time but may change.
Accordingly, two basically different situations can be as-
sumed. In the first case (called model A) the learning capa-
bility of a player decreases as a function of hy elapsed time
after a strategy adoption of y player. (The quantity hy can be
considered as an “effective age” of a strategy for player y.)
This time dependence describes the situation when a player
who keeps a strategy unchanged for a long time may loose
her/his capability to change. In other words, there is a con-
straint not to change a strategy that proved to be successful for
long, despite the fact that a neighbor may be more successful
presently. In the second case (called model B) the learning
capacity of a player is an increasing function of elapsed time
after strategy adoption. This time profile can be interpreted
in a way that a player who just changed strategy is satisfied
at first and is reluctant to change for a certain period. Later
his/her willingness to adopt strategy is recovered again.
Naturally, there are several possibilities to link the personal
wy learning capacity with the value of hy, that is the elapsed
time after a strategy adoption of player y. Without loosing
generality, we will use simple step-like functions for both
models. More precisely, for model A the learning capacity
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FIG. 1: (color online) Comparative plots of full b − K phase dia-
grams for model A obtained by setting H = 0 [panel (a)] and H = 10,
wmin = 0.01 [panel (b)]. (For easier comparison we used the same
b range for both diagrams.) Solid green and dotted red lines mark
the borders of all C and all D phases, whereas C+D show the mixed
phases where both C and D players are present in the stationary state.
Dashes line at b = 1 shows the limit of weak prisoner’s dilemma
game.
is given by
wy =
{
wmax = 1, if hy ≤ H
wmin, otherwise
, (2)
where H is a sort of threshold value of iteration time when the
learning capacity of focal player changes significantly. For a
minimal learning capacity we choose wmin = 0.01 to avoid
the system being trapped in an intermediate frozen state. Ev-
idently, for wmin = 1 or for H = 0 the original spatial model
is restored where all players have uniform, time-independent
learning capacities. The behavior of the latter model has al-
ready been studied extensively [19].
In model B the learning capacity of player y changes in time
in reverse order, namely
wy =
{
wmin, if hy ≤ H
wmax = 1, otherwise.
(3)
As we have already noted, the advantage of using step-like
functions is to have only one additional parameter for both
models, that is the threshold value of elapsed time after strat-
egy adoption when learning capacity changes. More sophisti-
cated functions with smooth time-dependence is also possible,
which we will also discuss in the following sections.
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FIG. 2: (color online) Time evolutions of a prepared initial configuration on a 100×100 square lattice for model A at wmin = 1 (upper panel,
from O1 to O4) and at wmin = 0.01 (lower panel, from A1 to A4). H = 10, b = 1.11, and K = 0.5 for both panels. As figure legend shows,
light yellow (light blue) denotes cooperators (defectors) whose learning capacity is wy = wmax since the elapsed time hy is shorter than H
after strategy adoption. Dark yellow (dark blue) denotes cooperators (defectors) whose learning capacity is wy = wmin as a consequence
of large hy value. In the original model (upper panel) the irregularity of the cooperative border makes the invasion of defectors easy into the
bulk of domain. Accordingly, the sliced cooperative domain cannot insure the appropriate environment for network reciprocity to work. In the
other case, when wmin = 0.01 (lower panel), the initial irregularity of domain border is smoothed out because cooperators in the bulk can
resist against the fast invasion of an intruder defector. Furthermore, cooperators in the bulk can strike back using the support of cooperator
neighbors. Snapshots are given after t = 0, 30, 180, and 450 iterations for upper panel and after t = 0, 2000, 17000, and 30000 iterations for
lower panel.
The presented Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were ob-
tained on populations comprising 100×100 to 1600×1600 in-
dividuals, whereby the stationary fractions of strategies were
determined within 105 to 107 full MC steps after sufficiently
long transients were discarded. It should be noted that the re-
laxation to stationary state is specially slow for model A. In
order to assure suitable accuracy, final results were averaged
over up to 5 − 20 independent runs for each set of parameter
values.
III. RESULTS FOR MODEL A
In this section we present results obtained for model A
when the learning capacities of players may reduce after strat-
egy adoption according to Eq. 2. Figure 1 shows the b − K
phase diagrams for H = 0 [panel (a)] and for H = 10 [panel
(b)]. Note that the case H = 0 (or wmin = 1) is practically
equivalent to the original spatial model where all players have
uniform time-independent learning capability [19]. As the
comparison demonstrates, the introduction of time-dependent
learning capacity results a slight, but unambiguous improve-
ment for cooperation level in dependence of b. This impact
is more visible for larger H values, but too large H, as we
will argue later, would reduce the change from the original
model. Interestingly, the phase diagram of model A plotted
in Fig. 1b agrees qualitatively with the b − K diagram when
time-dependent teaching activity was supposed [16]. Despite
this similarity, a completely different pattern formation mech-
anism can be detected in the present case.
The mechanism that explains the shift of phase borders to
larger b values is based on a sort of recovery effect of cooper-
ator domains. The previously mentioned network reciprocity
among cooperators can efficiently work if cooperators are ag-
gregated and the border with defector players is smooth. To
the contrary, irregular interface, just like well-mixed system,
is beneficial to defectors. Consequently, a fault in the interface
separating cooperator and defector domains can be a starting
point for defectors to initiate invasion into the bulk of cooper-
ator island if b is large enough. This invasion is illustrated on
the top panel of Fig. 2 where the sliced cooperative domain
cannot resist against the invasion of defectors who can col-
lect larger payoff as a consequence of relatively high b value.
Finally, the system terminates into the all D phase.
In case of time-dependent learning capacity of model A the
above described invasion is blocked efficiently in the body of
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FIG. 3: (color online) Cooperation level depending on H parameter
for model A at different scheduling rules for b = 1.07 and K = 0.5.
The applied rules are step-function, tanh-, and power-function-like
decay as demonstrated by the inset. The corresponding results de-
noted by closed (red) squares, open (green) squares, and open (blue)
circles, respectively.
cooperative domain as lower panel of Fig. 2 illustrates. Note
that players in the bulk rarely adopt strategy, therefore hy is
large enough to have the minimal wmin capacity for them.
(Figure 2 demonstrates clearly that players with young strate-
gies, marked by light yellow and light blue, are restricted to
the borders separating homogeneous areas.) Consequently,
cooperators with large hy are reluctant to adopt the intruder
defector strategy. On the other side, a player who has just
adopted defection at the surface has small hy hence maximal
wy = 1 learning capacity. This fact gives a chance for co-
operators in the bulk area, who still have supporting cooper-
ator neighbors, to strike back and regain the position of the
“young” defector. The above described mechanism, as a re-
covery effect, can smooth the border between defector and co-
operator domains, which helps cooperators to survive even at
larger b values where cooperators cannot survive in the origi-
nal model.
The above described effect is more pronounced when H is
larger. Too large H, however, has no impact on the final state
again. More precisely, if the system is started from a random
state and H is large enough (500 <∼ H) then players have no
chance to change learning capacity before the stationary state
is reached. (In other words, the strategy adoptions happen
more frequently than hy exceeds H.). Accordingly, the evo-
lution to the stationary state is practically similar to the case
when there is no time-dependence of learning capacity. This
behavior is demonstrated clearly in Fig. 3, where the fraction
of cooperators is plotted as a function of H parameter. To em-
phasize the cooperation boosting impact of time-dependent
learning activity, we have chosen b = 1.07 and K = 0.5
values which would result all D state (ρC = 0) in case of
time-independent learning activity (for H = 0).
Our findings are robust by applying different time profiles
for wy(hy) function. As the inset of Fig. 3 shows, we have
also applied analytical functions which insure gradual de-
crease of learning activity. Namely, the applied functions were
wy =
1
2
[1− tanh(hy − H)] (4)
and
wy =
(
1−
hy − H
hmax
)α
(5)
by keeping the learning activity in the 0.01 ≤ wy ≤ 1 interval.
We used α = 3 and hmax = 5 to produce data for Fig. 3.
Naturally, the final state depends on the new parameters but
the previously reported basic mechanisms remain intact.
IV. RESULTS FOR MODEL B
A surprisingly different behavior can be observed if we re-
verse the time-dependence of the evolution of learning capac-
ity according to model B, defined by Eq. 3. As we argued,
the temporary block of learning after a strategy adoption can
be interpreted in different ways. Thinking about humans, one
can easily imagine that a player is satisfied with the recently
adopted strategy for a certain period and searches for better
strategy just afterwards. More generally, strategy change may
involve some cost, hence a player cannot afford to change
strategy too frequently.
To reveal the possible consequences, let us follow what
happens at the border of C and D domains if cooperators
can accidentally invade a site from defectors when b is high.
Despite possible high temptation value, the neighboring “old
D” cannot strike back due to low wmin value of “young C”
player. Furthermore, the latter actor can resist D until the ef-
fective hy age insures low learning activity. Meanwhile, sim-
ilar C → D transition can happen in the neighborhood of the
mentioned C player. From this point, C players can support
each other and their strategy can spread further in D domains
where ”old” players can adopt the invaders’ strategy by hav-
ing wmax learning capacity. In short, “young C” players can
dominate “old” defectors.
As time passes, however, C players get older and become
vulnerable if hy exceeds H. Henceforth D can invade “old
C” players again if b is large enough. To sum up, a cyclic
“old D” → “young C” → “old C” → “young D” → “old
D” dominance evolves. Accordingly, a special pattern for-
mation emerges where the “fatten in front and slim at back”
mechanism for cooperator domains will produce propagating
waves. This is nicely demonstrated in the upper panel of
Fig. 4 where cooperators can spread in the sea of defectors
despite the fact that b = 1.3 is much higher than the tempta-
tion value where cooperators can survive in the original model
with time-independent learning capacity. According to the
above mentioned cyclic dominance, the spatial distributions
of strategies with specific “age” can be easily recognized as
shown by the order of colors as “dark blue”→ “light yellow”
→ “dark yellow”→ “light blue”→ “dark blue”. It is conspic-
uous the rare occurrence of “dark yellow” (old C) players that
is a straightforward consequence of high b: if a cooperator
5B1 B2 B3 B4
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FIG. 4: (color online) Time evolutions of prepared initial configurations on a 100 × 100 square lattice for model B at b = 1.3 (upper panel,
from B1 to B4) and at b = 0.80 (lower panel, from B5 to B8). H = 30, wmin = 0.01, and K = 0.5 for both panels. As figure legend shows,
light yellow (blue) denotes cooperators (defectors) whose learning capacity is wy = wmin since the elapsed time hy is shorter than H after
strategy adoption. Dark yellow (blue) denotes cooperators (defectors) whose learning capacity is wy = wmax as a consequence of large hy
value. The superiority of defectors (cooperators) in upper (lower) panel cannot manifest because a dynamically induced cyclic dominance
induces traveling waves that help the suppressed strategy to survive. Snapshots are given after t = 0, 90, 130, and 210 iterations for upper
panel and after t = 0, 90, 400, and 880 iterations for lower panel. Detailed explanation is given in the text.
becomes vulnerable by having wmax then it can be promptly
invaded by a neighboring defector player.
The same mechanism can be observed if defectors are sup-
pressed due to b < 1. In this case “young D” can resist co-
operators despite low b value but may invade “old C” who
has wmax learning activity. The direct consequence of pay-
off ranks can only be validated for “old D” players whose
learning capacities are recovered. The lower panel of Fig. 4
illustrates that defectors can survive via propagating waves in
the stag-hunt region, too. Naturally, the intensity of domi-
nance between strategies depends on the value of H and the
parameters of b and K , as well.
As it is known, the general role of K parameter is to mod-
erate the direct consequences of payoff differences originated
from the actual rank of payoff elements. Furthermore, as we
argued previously, the emerging cyclic dominance is based on
a dynamically induced mechanism and depends slightly on
payoff elements. Accordingly, the expansion of mixed C+D
state, as a result of cyclic dominance, is more vital at larger
K values. This expectation is in agreement with the T − K
phase diagrams of model B, plotted in Fig. 5. As the phase
diagram indicates, the impact of cyclic dominance is so pow-
erful that mixed phase is extended to such a large T region
where the vitality of cooperators cannot be reached by any
previously observed cooperator promoting mechanisms. This
behavior offers a possible new approach to the basic question
why cooperators can survive when payoff elements would pre-
dict the opposite solution. Generally, the primary goal is to
search for mechanism to strengthen cooperators, hence to ex-
tend the survival limit towards cooperator-unfriendly param-
eter region. On the other hand, the survival of cooperators
can be considered as a “diversity of strategies” where almost
equivalent strategies are maintained via a specific dynamical
mechanism.
The coexistence of species due to cyclic dominance is
a well-known phenomenon in cyclic Lotka-Volterra models
[20], in rock-scissors-paper game [21], or in general cyclic
competitive system [22] where at least three [23] or more
species [24] are present in the system. In the latter cases
the formation of propagating waves is a typical pattern due to
cyclic dominance of species [25]. In the present model, there
is, however, an important difference from the “traditional”
cyclic dominated systems. Namely, the relation of states is
time-dependent and some states can be transformed to another
one without the vicinity of the other state: “young” coopera-
tors or defectors will become “old” cooperators or defectors
as time passes. The time dependence of states, as Glauber-
type dynamics, may explain why we cannot observe rotating
spirals for model B.
As a further consequence of time-dependent relations of
states, there is another type of difference in pattern formation
comparing to classical cyclic dominated systems. For rock-
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FIG. 5: (color online) Full T −K phase diagrams for model B ob-
tained for different interaction graph using H = 10. Panel (a): square
lattice at S = 0. Panel (b): small world graph (with z = 4) at
S = −1. In both panels solid (green) and dotted (red) lines mark
the borders of all C and all D phases, whereas C+D shows the mixed
phase where both strategies are present in the stationary state. Dashes
line at T = 1 shows the limit of weak prisoner’s dilemma game.
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FIG. 6: (color online) Impact of time-dependent learning activity for
different topologies and payoff parametrizations. In all panels open
(red) circles depict results obtained with standard version of the game
(time-independent teaching activity), while open (blue) and closed
(green) squares show stationary ρC obtained by model A and model
B, respectively. Panel (a): square lattice for S = 0, (b): square lattice
for S = −0.3, (c): triangle lattice for S = 0, and (d): triangle lattice
for S = −0.3. In all cases K = 0.5 and the time schedule parameter
is H = 10.
scissors-paper game, it was previously demonstrated that the
pattern formation depends crucially on the topology of inter-
action graph of players. More specifically, if lattice topology
is replaced by a small-world graph [26] then the time indepen-
dent strategy density functions become oscillatory as a conse-
quence of short-cuts (long-range interactions) in the connec-
tivity graph [27]. To reveal the possibility of such oscillation,
we have also applied random regular graph topology using
the same z = 4 degree of nodes. Despite existing shortcuts
the frequencies of strategies were always constant in time in
stationary states when the dynamics of model B was applied.
As we argued, this deviation may be related to the previously
mentioned Glauber-type dynamics in the cyclic dominance.
Finally, we should stress that our observations are not re-
stricted to specific interaction graph or payoff parametrization
of weak prisoner’s dilemma game. To demonstrate this, we
have plotted sections of phase diagrams in Fig. 6, where dif-
ferent lattices and S values were used. As earlier studies sug-
gested [1, 19], interaction graph with substantial clustering
coefficient may influence the cooperation level relevantly. To
clarify this issue, we have checked triangle lattice and found
the same qualitative behavior as for square lattice. Namely,
the application of time decaying learning activity improves
slightly the cooperation level comparing to the results of time-
independent learning activity. In the other case, when the
learning activity increases with time after strategy adoption,
the mixed C+D phase may expand significantly resulting in a
higher chance of cooperators to survive even at large tempta-
tion parameter values.
V. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, we have studied the impact of time-
dependent learning capacities of players within spatial pris-
oner’s dilemma game. There are two significantly different
time profiles for learning activity, namely, the skill of a player
to adopt alternating strategy may weaken or strengthen as time
passes after strategy adoption. By choosing the simplest step-
like function, in model A the personal wy learning capacity
changes from wmax = 1 to wmin = 0.01 when the elapsed
time exceeds H threshold iterations after strategy adoption.
Accordingly in model B, this change happens from wmin to
wmax at a threshold value of H.
In contrast to the preliminary expectations, these modifica-
tions of the standard spatial model with uniform players re-
sulted significant changes in stationary states. The time de-
creasing learning activity helps cooperator domains to recover
the possible intrusion of defectors hence extend the critical
temptation to higher values. On the other hand, the temporary
restrained learning activity generates a sort of cyclic domi-
nance between defector and cooperator strategies. As a con-
sequence, the spatial pattern is characterized by propagating
waves and the resulting mixed C + D state becomes a vi-
able solution even at extremely wide T region starting from
stag-hunt to heavy prisoner’s dilemma game. It should be also
stressed that the microscopic rule is strategy-independent for
both models, hence the resulting output is not a straightfor-
7ward consequence of a direct cooperator supporting strategy
update. Our observations are robust and remain valid if we
use different interaction graphs or time profiles for strategy
learning activity.
Previous studies focused to find cooperator promoting
mechanisms that help to extend the limit of parameter space
for cooperators to survive. Our work highlights a possible
alternative way to keep cooperators alive without postulat-
ing additional strategies [17, 28]. This dynamically induced
mechanism, just like migration [29], forms new type of pat-
terns in stationary state. Similar dynamically generated (but
completely different) effect has already been observed when
time-dependent teaching activity (or reputation) of players
was supposed [16]. The remarkable variety of dynamically
induced mechanisms suggests that further pattern formating
effects are expected if time-dependent player-specific quanti-
ties are supposed in spatial evolutionary game systems.
Acknowledgments
A. S. acknowledges support from the Hungarian National
Research Fund (grant K-73449) and the Bolyai Research
Grant.
[1] G. Szabo´ and G. Fa´th, Phys. Rep. 446, 97 (2007); K. Sigmund,
The Calculus of Selfishness (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton, MA, 2010).
[2] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Games and Popula-
tion Dynamics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
1998); C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, and A. Sa´nchez, Phys. Life Rev.
6, 208 (2009).
[3] M. A. Nowak, Science 314, 1560 (2006); Z.-X. Wu, X.-J. Xu,
Z.-G. Huang, S.-J. Wang, and Y.-H. Wang, Phys. Rev. E 74,
021107 (2006); F. Fu, L. Wang, M. A. Nowak, and C. Hauert,
Phys. Rev. E 79, 046707 (2009); J. M. Pacheco, A. Traulsen,
and M. A. Nowak, J. Theor. Biol. 243, 437 (2006).
[4] A. Traulsen, M. A. Nowak, and J. M. Pacheco, J. Theor. Biol.
244, 349 (2007); D.-P. Yang, H. Lin, C.-X. Wu, and J.-W. Shuai,
New J. Phys. 11, 073048 (2009); L. Wardil and J. K. L. da Silva,
EPL 86, 38001 (2009).
[5] D. Helbing and A. Johansson, Phys. Rev. E 81, 016112 (2010);
C. P. Roca, J. A. Cuesta, and A. Sa´nchez, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97,
158701 (2006); W.-B. Du, X.-B. Cao, M.-B. Hu, H.-X. Yang,
and H. Zhou, Physica A 388, 2215 (2009).
[6] F. C. Santos and J. M. Pacheco, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098104
(2005).
[7] M. A. Nowak and R. M. May, Nature 359, 826 (1992).
[8] A. Szolnoki and G. Szabo´, EPL 77, 30004 (2007); X. Chen,
F. Fu and L. Wang, Int. J. Mod. Phys. C 19, 1377 (2008).
[9] M. Perc, A. Szolnoki, and G. Szabo´, Phys. Rev. E 78, 066101
(2008).
[10] F. C. Santos, M. D. Santos, and J. M. Pacheco, Nature 454, 213
(2008).
[11] Z.-X. Wu, X.-J. Xu, and Y.-H. Wang, Chin. Phys. Lett. 23, 531
(2006).
[12] M. Perc, New J. Phys. 8, 183 (2006).
[13] D. Peng, H.-X. Yang, W.-X. Wang, G. R. Chen, and B.-H.
Wang, Eur. Phys. J. B 73, 455 (2010).
[14] M. Perc and A. Szolnoki, BioSystems 99, 109 (2010); F. Fu,
T. Wu, and L. Wang, Phys. Rev. E 79, 036101 (2009); S.-M.
Qin, G.-Y. Zhang, and Y. Chen, Physica A 388, 4893 (2009).
[15] A. Szolnoki and M. Perc, New J. Phys. 10, 043036 (2008);
J. Poncela, J. Go´mez-Garden˜es, A. Traulsen, and Y. Moreno,
New J. Phys. 11, 083031 (2009).
[16] A. Szolnoki, M. Perc, G. Szabo´, and H.-U. Stark, Phys. Rev. E
80, 021901 (2009).
[17] C. Hauert, S. De Monte, J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund, Science
296, 1129 (2002).
[18] G. Szabo´ and C. To˝ke, Phys. Rev. E 58, 69 (1998).
[19] G. Szabo´, J. Vukov, and A. Szolnoki, Phys. Rev. E 72, 047107
(2005).
[20] T. Reichenbach, M. Mobilia, and E. Frey, Phys. Rev. E 74,
051907 (2006); G. A. Tsekouras, A. Provata, and C. Tsallis,
Phys. Rev. E 69, 016120 (2004).
[21] T. Reichenbach, M. Mobilia, and E. Frey, Nature 448, 1046
(2007); W.-X. Wang, Y.-C. Lai, and C. Grebogi, Phys. Rev. E
81, 046113 (2010); H. Shi, W.-X. Wang, R. Yang, and Y.-C.
Lai, Phys. Rev. E 81, 030901(R) (2010).
[22] G. Szabo´, M. A. Santos, and J. F. F. Mendes, Phys. Rev. E 60,
3776 (1999); T. Reichenbach, M. Mobilia, and E. Frey, J. Theor.
Biol. 254, 368 (2008); J. C. Claussen and A. Traulsen, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 100, 058104 (2008); R. Yang, W.-X. Wang, Y.-C.
Lai, and C. Grebogi, Chaos 20, 023113 (2010); L.-L. Jiang,
T. Zhou, M. Perc, X. Huang, and B.-H. Wang, New J. Phys. 11,
103001 (2009); G. J. Szo¨llo˝si and I. Dere´nyi, Phys. Rev. E 78,
031919 (2008).
[23] T. Reichenbach and E. Frey, Phys. Rev. Lett. 101, 058102
(2008); C.-Y. Ying, D.-Y. Hua, and L.-Y. Wang, J. Phys. A:
Math. Theor. 40, 4477 (2007).
[24] G. Szabo´, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 38, 6689 (2005); M. Pel-
toma¨ki and M. Alava, Phys. Rev. E 78, 031906 (2008); G.-Y.
Zhang, Y. Chen, W.-K. Qi, and S.-M. Qing, Phys. Rev. E 79,
062901 (2009); G. Szabo´ and G. A. Sznaider, Phys. Rev. E 69,
031911 (2004).
[25] G. Szabo´ and A. Szolnoki, Phys. Rev. E 65, 036115 (2002);
A. Provata and G. A. Tsekouras, Phys. Rev. E 67, 056602
(2003); T. Reichenbach, M. Mobilia, and E. Frey, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 99, 238105 (2007).
[26] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
[27] A. Szolnoki and G. Szabo´, Phys. Rev. E 70, 037102 (2004);
G. Szabo´, A. Szolnoki, and R. Izsa´k, J. Phys. A: Math. Gen. 37,
2599 (2004).
[28] G. Szabo´ and C. Hauert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 118101 (2002).
[29] D. Helbing and W. Yu, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 106, 3680
(2009); M. Droz, J. Szwabinski, and G. Szabo´, Eur. Phys. J.
B 71, 579 (2009); Z.-X. Wu and P. Holme, Phys. Rev. E 80,
026108 (2009); L.-L. Jiang, W.-X. Wang, Y.-C. Lai, and B.-H.
Wang, Phys. Rev. E 81, 036108 (2010); H.-X. Yang, Z.-X. Wu,
and B.-H. Wang, Phys. Rev. E 81, 065101(R) (2010).
